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ABSTRACT

The UnitedStates followed a path of initiallygiving little protection
to intellectualproperty (IP)so that the country could benefit from the IP
of nations we term earlier-movers on the world stage of economic
development. This symposium piece argues that Japan and China have
been following a similar trajectory in their intellectual property laws
while progressing on their own economic climb. Widespread
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international outsourcing of manujacturing has made intellectual
property a key assetfor private companies, which has strengthened the
tendencies of earlier-movers to formulate and enforce strict intellectual
property laws. This suggests that countrieslike China respondnot only to
pressure from earlier-movers like the United States to increase
intellectualproperty protection, but are also driven by concerns against
their own later-movers. Perhaps curiously, if the hierarchy of movers
shifts and the relative interest in intellectualproperty enforcement does
as well, China will someday seek to protect its goods againstinfringement
by the likes of the United States and Japan.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On World Intellectual Property Day, we not only celebrate invention and
innovation, but also we recognize how integral intellectual property
rights are to our Nation's economic competitiveness. Intellectual
property rights support the arts, sciences, and technology. They also
create the framework for a competitive market that leads to higher wages
and more jobs for everyone. The United States is committed to
protecting the intellectual property rights of our companies and ensuring
a level playing field in the world economy for our Nation's creators,
inventors, and entrepreneurs.
Intellectual property is commonly argued to be a source of economic
competitiveness, and its protection is critically important to those
countries that perceive themselves as having an economic and
technological edge. Indeed, intellectual property protection allows earliermovers (those who through previous scientific or technological
innovation have an edge over competitors) to maintain their advantage
vis-A-vis later-movers (those who seek to catch up to and overtake earliermovers). However, historically most scientific or technological
innovations of import have-even in the face of penalty of death-been
transferred to and critically improved upon by later-movers. Earliermovers have a tendency to become overtaken by later-movers that learn
from and improve upon the knowledge of earlier-movers. From the
perspective of countries' economic competitiveness, the danger of
knowledge transfer stems not from the prospect of unfair competition but,
in the long run, from the possibility that the recipient might overtake the

1.

The White House, Proclamation, President DonaldJ Tromp Proclaims April 26, 2018, as

World Intellectual Property Day, WITE HOUSE (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-proclaims-april-26-2018-world-intellectual-propertyday/ [https://perma.cc/VUX5-AMV2].
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source by innovating on the knowledge transferred. Countries that have
the earlier-mover advantage in some domain have a strong incentive to
protect their intellectual property against later-movers at any one point in
time. That said, to the extent that a country is concerned with maintaining
a perceived economic or technical lead, intellectual property protection is
only one element of a larger strategy that must emphasize intellectual
property production. Intellectual property protection safeguards past
innovation, but future innovation requires continuous intellectual property
production that necessitates more than just a solid intellectual property
legal framework.
Countries' views toward and willingness to enact as well as enforce
intellectual property laws often track their level of not just absolute but
also relative economic development, as illustrated by the examples of the
United States, Japan, and recently, China. All three countries realized
rapid economic growth by first building the human and physical
infrastructure needed to sustain growth, and then, selectively, by hook or
by crook, learning from other countries. As these countries began to
overtake competitors economically and technically, their intellectual
property protection laws became increasingly strict and severe. With
economic growth, countries that previously acted as industrial spies and
infringers of others' intellectual property seem to become stalwart
defenders and maintainers of (their own) intellectual property rights.
The Trump Administration's full-court press against what it argues
to be unfair competition from China-one prong of which is vociferous
U.S. government complaints of intellectual property infringementmakes the question of what role intellectual property plays in economic
competitiveness not only academically interesting but also highly salient.
The basic argument by the Administration seems to be that American
economic competitiveness vis-a-vis China can be maintained by
strengthening intellectual property protection. This argument rests on the
assumption that China is a copycat that on balance infringes more on
others' intellectual property than it creates. The situation may be shifting,
and the argument overlooks the decades-long investment-driven rise of
China. Currently, and going forward, China might in fact be producing
more intellectual property of certain types than the United States and
protecting it through an increasingly robust legal system. This has farreaching consequences both for the United States and China. To explore
these consequences, this symposium piece analyzes the relationship
between intellectual property and economic development over time in
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general, as well as specifically in the cases of the United States, Japan,
and China.2
Part II presents the idea of earlier-mover and later-mover advantages
as applied to intellectual property and economic development. The earliermover advantage is the technological and economic competitive
advantage that a company or country has vis-At-vis its competitors by
virtue of relative temporal precedence. The compound nature of economic
growth and the importance of earlier inventions for later ones mean that
being earlier in seeing rapid, or even comparatively high, economic
growth and technological development pays dividends over long periods
of time. Being a later-mover provides its own set of advantages, not least
of which is the possibility of leapfrogging the earlier-mover by skipping
intermediate steps. We use the terms earlier-mover (rather than first- or
early-mover) and later-mover(rather than second- or late-mover) because
this piece describes countries' positions relative to each other, which can
vary over time. The West in general, and the United States in particular,
has for decades had the earlier-mover advantage. East Asia in general, and
China in particular, has shown how the later-mover advantage can be
exploited with the right policy package.
Part III analyzes three cases of economic development-those of the
United States, Japan, and China-and its relationship with infringement,
production, and protection of intellectual property. In the past decades, the
first two countries have been earlier-movers with a clear economic and
technological advantage over later-movers. However, all three countries
have a history of being classified as later-movers: the United States vis-avis Great Britain and Europe; Japan vis-A-vis the United States and the
West; and China vis-Ai-vis the United States, the West, and Japan. In the
cases of the United States and Japan, flagrant initial intellectual property
infringement along with a more (for Japan) or less (for the United States)
purposeful investment in intellectual property production led to economic
growth and increasingly stringent intellectual property protection.
Aggressive and successful exploitation of the later-mover advantage over
time led both the United States and Japan to equally assertively protect
2.
Intellectual property covers a large swath of intangible property, and it is used here in the
same sense as indicated in the March 22, 2018 Report of the United States Trade Representative on
China. That is to say, it covers the legally protected know-how that undergirds a modem economy,
i.e., "patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets." OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
Findings of the Investigation Into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology
Trans/er, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act o/1974, at 6
(March 22, 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section /"20301 /20FINAL.PDF
[https://
perma.cc/N23A-KBLQ]. Relatedly, when not qualified, development in this symposium piece refers
to social and economic development.
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their-at times arguably ill-begotten-earlier-mover advantage as they
out-grew and out-innovated those upon whose intellectual property they
had initially infringed. China has so far followed closely in the footsteps
of both the United States and especially Japan, allegedly infringing on the
intellectual property of earlier-movers, significantly investing in domestic
intellectual property production, and building a comprehensive
framework for protecting intellectual property. A future where China
expects the same protection of its intellectual property that former earliermovers demanded from it might not be far off.
Part IV builds on the previous parts and presents the argument that
while intellectual property protection is important, production (which
depends heavily on many factors outside the legal framework) is equally
if not more important. Intellectual property protection alone will not allow
any country to maintain an edge vis-Ai-vis other countries. Historically,
with the possible exception of Greek Fire, knowledge transfer has been
inevitable even upon pain of death. What allowed some countries to gain
and maintain economic competitiveness was their capacity to develop
new science and technologies. If an emphasis on the protection of old
intellectual property is not accompanied by policy initiatives to promote
the production of innovative goods, such emphasis could prove to be
highly disadvantageous. Furthermore, to the extent that intellectual
property protections blunt the later-mover advantage, an ironclad global
intellectual property regime is likely to make it harder for overtaken
earlier-movers to catch up again once they become later-movers.
1I.

EARLIER- AND LATER-MOVER ADVANTAGE

While the idea of earlier-mover and later-mover advantages is wellestablished in the business world, the concept also holds in political
economy. Being an earlier-mover pays dividends for a country over long
periods of time because of the largely cumulative nature of scientific and
technological progress, and the compound nature of economic growth. In
fact, the best predictor of a country's future development level is its past
development level. 3 However, history is replete with earlier-movers
losing their edge to later-movers that first copy and then innovate.
Being a later-mover provides its own set of advantages, not least of
which is the possibility of leapfrogging the earlier-mover by skipping

3.
Mattias Ottervik, Gender and Progress:How Gender Equality Affects Long-Term Human
Development48-49, Ph.D. thesis, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Government
and Public Administration, 2017 (on file with authors).
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intermediate steps.4 For example, it took almost four hundred years from
the publication of William Gilberte's De Magnete in 1600, which
introduced the word electricity, to the creation of the integrated circuit by
Texas Instruments. The earlier-mover advantage of the West allowed for
its development of integrated circuits. The later-mover advantage consists
of the short-circuiting (no pun intended) of centuries of piecemeal
scientific progress. Non-Western integrated circuit designers and
manufacturers do not have to start by working themselves up from the
first principles of electricity; rather, these actors skip all intermediate
steps.
History is replete with examples of later-movers scientifically and
economically overtaking earlier-movers. Almost all technical and
scientific developments of note and import have invariably been spread.
For most of history, knowledge transfer has been an immutable force. 5
The question then is not how to prevent it, but what is to be done given its
inevitability. Because of the cumulative nature of scientific and
technological development, the key question is how will each innovation
be made the basis for the next, and who will the next innovator be?
Movable type printing was critical for the progress and dissemination of
science during the Western Renaissance and Enlightenment,6 but
foundational to that was the comparatively cheap and sturdy paper
invented in China. 7 It is doubtful that movable type printing would have

had the impact it did if Gutenberg had been forced to print on papyrus or
parchment. Some of this diffusion of knowledge happened naturally (such
as Indian numerals being adopted throughout the Middle East before
making it to Europe), but most happened through more sordid means. For
example, paper-making likely arrived in Europe by way of the Abbasid
Caliphate's capture of Chinese paper-makers at the Battle of Talas.
While the Industrial Revolution was a period of rapid technical,
economic, and scientific development across the West, its national
foundation was laid not seldom through industrial espionage and

4.

See generallv ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE: A BOOK OF ESSAYS (1962).

5.

George Basalla, The Spread of (IesternSicnce, 156 SCIENCE 611 (1967)

Steven J. Ilaris,
(Katharine

cm orks o/ TraveL Correspondence.and Exchange, in 3 CAM3RIDGE I IIs.SCF. 4L
341

Park & Lorraine Daston eds., 2006).
6.
46 101,

7.

See ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE
164 208 (1983).

Susan 0. Thompson, Paper Manufacturing and Earv Books, 314 ANNALS N.Y. ACADEMY

SCI. 167, 167(1978).
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intellectual property infringement.8 British entrepreneurs illegally copied
Italian designs for mechanized silk-spinning, and then improved upon and
used them to spin cotton, which had a significantly larger market. 9 Latermover United States, in turn, encouraged the illicit, and according to
British law, illegal transfer of knowledge to the United States.
Entrepreneurs in the United States improved upon that knowledge, and its
government over time became as forceful a proponent of protection of
proprietary knowledge as had been Italy's and Great Britain's. Christoph
Roser, describing the round-robin industrial espionage behind the creation
of modern manufacturing across the West, summarizes it in the following
way:
It is easy to see analogies. Italian and British industrialists back then
were probably as upset about the theft of intellectual property as modern
industrialists are about technology theft. Similarly, modem China, on
the receiving end of many modem-day transfers, is probably as snug as
a bug about this gain as the United States or Germany was back then. In
were, at best, only able to slow down the
all cases, countermeasures
10
knowledge transfers.
Proprietary knowledge was illicitly transferred between competitor
nations throughout the Industrial Revolution like it had been in ages past.

8. CHRISTOPH ROSER, "FASTER, BETTER, CHEAPER" IN THE HISTORY OF MANUFACTURING:
FROM THE STONE AGE TO LEAN MANUFACTURING AND BEYOND 110 (2017).
9. Id. at 104 10.

10.

Id. at 110.
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Figure 1. Human Development 1850- 2010

In modem times both Japan and China were quintessential latermovers. When American gun-boats forcibly opened Japan, this set off a
civil war whose victors formed the Meiji government and concluded that
Japan was, in terms of wealth and power, about 40 years behind the West.
The new Japanese government initiated a global fact-finding mission, the
twakura Mission, which visited the most developed countries in the world
to search for clues to their economic and military power. The lessons
learned were immediately turned into social and economic policy.
Judicious application of what it had learned from earlier-movers
transformed Japan into an industrial power over the course of a
generation. Similarly, at the founding of the People's Republic, China was
one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world, and as its
government set about improving quality of life fbr its citizens, it had its
work cut out for it. However, China benefited from foreign examples to
enhance its learning, and learn it did. Like their Japanese counterparts
before them, Chinese intellectuals and the Chinese government scoured
the world for the sort of practical knowledge that would allow China to
realize rapid development. One way to quantify just how far behind Japan
and China were at various points in time with regard to other countries is
to compare their level of human development--a United Nations-created
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composite measure of education, health, and material welfare." As shown
in Figure 1,12 in terms of human development both Japan and China were
able to realize rapid improvements: in the case of Japan allowing it to
catch up to earlier-mover United States, and in the case of China going
from being one of the least developed to one of the more developed
countries in the world.
III.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT

By making some knowledge proprietary, legal protection, at least in
theory, offers an effective mechanism of blunting the later-mover
advantage in the short term. In the case of the United States, it allowed
companies to transfer manufacturing know-how to developing countries
like China while still retaining a sense of ownership. Production could be
outsourced because there was, in theory at least, little fear that
manufacturers would turn around and wholesale infringe on the
intellectual property rights of their customers. The lack of fear was
justified for two reasons. First, most Western consumer brands sourced
manufacturing or design expertise from other companies, an arrangement
that would not have been possible without intellectual property protection.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, as long as the outsourcing
companies had an innovation pipeline (not seldom fed by past public
investments), manufacturing was not a key part of the value chain. In the
case of the U.S., it had ARPANET, the progenitor of the modem
interet,' 3 and the space program, which led to the development of
integrated circuits. These public investments--especially when paired
with world-class universities attracting students from all over the world
who often stayed in the U.S-paid dividends decades after they were
made and led to the creation of companies like Apple, Microsoft, and Dell,
and to the 1990s economic boom in the United States.' 4 It took Japan 30

11.

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990,9

16 (1990), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/219/hdr 1990 en complete nostats.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2CXD-SXZ4].
12.

Leandro Prados de la Escosura, World Human Development: 1870-2007, 61 REV. INCOME

& WEALTH 220, 230, 234 (2015) (presenting data for Figure 1 from HIHD columns in Table I and
Table 2); Ottervik, supra note 3, at 105 07.
13. ARPANET was funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the United States
Department of Defense. WALTER ISAACSON, THE INNOVATORS: HOW A GROUP OF HACKERS,
GENIUSES, AND GEEKS CREATED THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION 235 37 (2014).

14.
&

Paul Ceruzzi, Apollo Guidance Computer and the First Silicon Chips, SMITHSONIAN AIR

SPACE MUSEUM

https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/apollo-guidance-computer-and-first-

silicon-chips [https://perma.cc/PAC4-L6VV]; see generally Timothy Sturgeon, How Silicon Valley
Came to Be, in

UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL
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years to grant a patent on the integrated circuit,1 5 which allowed for
infringement of American intellectual property in the meantime.
Nevertheless, the innovation pipeline in the United States in general and
Silicon Valley in particular enabled American companies to dominate the
first decades of the computer revolution. 16 The United States, while the
cradle of this revolution, may be losing its edge in that area, though.
There appears to be a significant change in the relative
innovativeness of the United States and China. The latter has frequently
globally been viewed as the most significant intellectual property thief
that reaps where it has not sown.17 China has long been seen as both a
mass manufacturer and significant consumer of goods that infringes upon
every area of intellectual property law, be it patents, copyright,
trademarks, or trade secrets. In recent years, however, China has taken
measures such as to reduce problems previously associated with "local
judicial protectionism: challenges in obtaining evidence[;] small damage
awards[;] and a perceived bias against foreign firms."1 8 In significant part,
this change is being driven by both a maturation of the Chinese judicial
system and the fact that China is now, like the United States and Japan
before it, producing too much valuable intellectual property not to protect
it.

REGION

15-47 (Martin Kenney ed., 2000); PAUL FREIBERGER & MICHAEL SWAINE, FIRE IN THE

VALLEY: THE MAKING OF THE PERSONAL COMPUTER (2000).

15.
John C. Lindgren & Craig J. Yudell, Protecting American Intellectual Propern in
Japan, 10 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 7 9 (1994).
16. Tracey Samuelson, How the U.S. Outgrew 1980s Trade Anxiety Over Japan,
MARKETPLACE para. 19 (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/2018/11/29/economy/howus-outgrew- 1980s-anxiety-over-japan [https://penna.cc/Y3WU-NLG6].
17. Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline ol the Intellectual PropertyPowers, 34 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 525, 549 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Rise and Decline]; Peter Yu, IntellectualProperty, Economic
Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:
STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais

ed., 2007) [hereinafter Yu, China Puzzle]. See generally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners:
ProtectingIntellectual Property in Chinain the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000);
Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners(Episode II). ProtectingIntellectual Property in Post-WTO
China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006).
18. See William Weightman, China's Progress on Intellectual Property Rights (Yes, Really),
DIPLOMAT (Jan. 20, 2018), para. 4 https://thediplomat.com/2018/01 /chinas-progress-on-intellectualproperty-rights-yes-really/ [https://perma.cc/RW2G-2286].
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As shown in Figure 2, in 2016, Chinese entities applied for as many
patents as Japan and the United States combined.' 9 There is some reason
to question the quality of Chinese patent applications,"0 and the number
of applications might be inflated by patent subsidy programs. 21 That being
said, while the overall number of patents may be inflated, the growth does
reflect an increase in innovation. Supporting the idea that patent filings
are showing an underlying change in innovation is that China is making
rapid headway in broader measures of innovativeness such as the Global

.1s Cente . Vs1 P( httpsii'www3.wipo int/ipstats/ (lat visited May
is Data
W IPI) IP t
2-d
(WIPO atics database toolI used to pull data to,
Thn Any Coum T Most Are Wonrthl s,
20. Lulu Yihn CThen, China Claims More Patts
Bi.oOMBERt, para. 3 (Sept. 28 2018), htps: wbloomberg.cominewsartilesi2018-09-26chinaclaims-more-patents-than-any-country-most-are-worthless [https:/ pema.cc PP2F-SMVU],
21
Jianwci Dang & Kazuyuki Motohashi, Patent Statisti s A (Goodlndicator rInnoIvation
in ( hina? Patent Subsi, Program Impacts on Pawnt Quality, 35 CtHINA ECON. REV. 137, 137
(2015).
22. Dan Prud'homme, Chinese Patent Quantity and Patent Quality, and the Role qofthe State,
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I
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ipapers ssi nom so/I papersm
https:
19.
2(1 ,()1

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:877

Innovation Index shown in Figure 3. This is important for two reasons.
First, foreign policy-makers have to drastically change their views of the
world. For example, when Apple adjusted its earning guidance largely
based on poor sales in China Larry Kudlow suggested that intellectual
property infringement by Chinese phone manufacturers could explain the
drop in sales. 4 However, the thought of China as a source of only cheap,
low-quality knock-offs is outdated.
2013-2018 Global Innovation Index Rank
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,

°

-

China

Japan
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United States

Figure 3. Global Innovation Index Rankings 2013-2018
The second reason why the drastic increase in patent filings is
important is that the cases of the United States and Japan suggest that
countries' views toward and willingness to enact as well as enforce
intellectual property laws track their level of not just absolute, but also
relative economic development. The United States was resistant to
adopting strong protections during its early stages of development,
wanting to borrow liberally from the fruits of earlier-movers like Great
Britain. Japan reacted the same way, initially wishing to benefit from its
23.
Cornell University INSEAD, & World Intellectual Property Organizaion, Globil
lnovation
Indlet
20I/:
Lncr,; 2ion, he
torld
it
hio,
WIPO
(2018),
https:/!
lw.1ipo.int
edo/p
Ibdoc
\\enwipo
pub gii 2018.pdf [https:/permaec/FRL3-BQ3C].
Ired hbert, it ltIout Advisor And/on
',o Aphl [Cthno/ogy Mqo
tcae Been
Pi(/ed(o/ l
China,
(CNBC
ira. 2 (Jan. 4, 2018) https://www cnbc.eom/20t9901 04 whiue-houseadxior-kudlow says-apple-technology-nay-hive-been-picked-off-by china.html
[http:peria cc/AX7 -DYJC].
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own earlier-mover, the United States, until it reached a certain level of
wealth. Today, Japan's intellectual property production is increasing at a
rapid pace.2 5 Modem history is replete with examples where the United
States and Japan agree and at times join forces when it comes to pushing
for stronger intellectual property protections at both the national and
international levels. The two countries emphasize intellectual property
protections that weave together civil and criminal measures, and they
advocate for the need for proper legal incentives for creation and
invention. They both tend to favor a combination of greater sanctions and
more powerful enforcement in the international arena, often clashing with
countries that do not share the same priorities. China may have reached
its own turning point as Chinese companies have begun to assert their
patents against companies and competitors in other countries. While
China may have historically responded to threats and obligations accepted
under international treaties (and even then, far from the level that earliermovers expected to see), other motivations now seem to be driving the
country's behavior.
A.

Intellectual Property and Development in the United States

The Founding Fathers understood the importance of including an
intellectual property system as they were drafting the Constitution, and
they specified in the Intellectual Property Clause of the document that
Congress must have the power "[tfo promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. 26 This
language was drawn from England's Statute of Anne, which has since
,,27
become known as "the source of Anglo-American copyright law.
That said, and while the United States became an innovation hub in
modem history that sought to advocate for the enforcement of
international standards against intellectual property piracy:
In the nineteenth century, it was a post-colonial nation, its cultural life
derivative and its economy underdeveloped [which] declined to
participate in international copyright agreements. Only by the end of the
25.
See Bloomberg, Japan'sIntellectual PropertyGenerating Revenue at RecordPace,JAPAN
TIMES para. I (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.japanti-nes.co.jp/news/2018/01/16/business/economybusiness/japans-intellectual-property-generating-revenue-record-pace/#.W5AVq5NKiu4
[https://perma.cc/676G-4BQ7] (noting that revenue from intellectual property increased by 74% over
the previous five years and reached record heights in 2017).
26. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
27.
Oren Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute nfAnne in the Land of UnlimitedPossibilities:
The Life of a Legal Transplant,25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1427, 1427 (2010).
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nineteenth century, after the United States had joined the ranks of the
world's major industrial powers, did the government adopt
legislation
28
protecting the intellectual property of non-U.S. citizens.
In that sense, there was some potential tension between the universalist,
Enlightenment-motivated sentiments that the Founders enshrined in the
Constitution versus the narrower interests in pre-Constitution state
copyright laws and post-Constitution national copyright laws proposed
and passed by other politicians.29
The United States initially refused to grant copyright protection to
foreign authors, which especially hurt English authors; indeed, "[b]etween
1800 and 1860, almost half of the bestsellers in the United States were
pirated mostly from English novels. ' 3 ° Some English authors (including
Charles Dickens and Anthony Trollope) managed to get special
protections such that American publishing houses promised not to publish
"editions of a foreign work that w[ere] already the subject of an agreement
between its author and another publishing house," which enabled the
authors to make money through so-called "courtesy copyright" even if
they did not officially benefit from U.S. copyright laws. 3 1 This system
eventually failed, as did initial attempts at bilateral treaties between the
United States and Great Britain. 32 "Congress [ultimately] did not grant
any protection to foreign authors until the 1870s," which also resulted in
American authors experiencing the same discrimination in foreign
33
countries.
Other nations alleviated the problem associated with protecting
foreign works by joining the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works in 1886, a step that the United States did not
take for over a hundred years, namely until 1989. 34 The importance of the
Berne Convention cannot be overstated. It marked, to some, "the point at
which the ramshackle and disorganized collection of bilateral treaties
inevitably gave way to the rationality of a multilateral regime that

28.
Thomas Bender & David Sampliner, Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of American
Literature,29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 255, 255 (1997) (citing AUBREY J. CLARK, THE MOVE MENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1960)).
29.
See id. at 258 n.11.
30.
Yu, Rise and Decline, supra note 17, at 534 (2012) (citation omitted).
31.
Id. at 534 35 (citation omitted).
32.
Id. at 535 36.
33.
Id. at 537 38 (citations omitted).
34. For a discussion of the background and negotiations surrounding the Berne Convention,
see Daniel Gervais, Golan v. Holder: A Look at the ConstraintsImposed by the Berne Convention,
64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 147, 147 (2011).
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established common standards of copyright protection. ' 35 It was also a
time of uniting the civil and common law traditions of copyright. Indeed,
these traditions "were brought together (and simultaneously tainted) in a
treaty which stipulated the minimum conditions that signatories had to
comply with."' 36 All this said, some scholars warn that the shape and
membership of the Berne Convention in 1885 were in no way inevitable,
but rather hinged on many political forces and contingencies.37
In the twentieth century, "the increasing value of intellectual
property [was accompanied by] rapid increase in legislative activity, and
concomitant lobbying activity. '38 Robert Merges does not believe that
lobbying needs to be a cause of concern per se because it is what one
would expect when "intellectual property now constitutes a crucial set of
corporate assets in the new information economy." 39 He acknowledges
that "in some cases increased expenditures may be cause for concern.
Both public choice theory and empirical evidence suggest that some types
of intellectual property legislation may be prone to excessive privateinterest influence, or rent-seeking. 4 ° In his view, these examples include
the extension of copyright terms (which he deems to be almost exclusively
the result of such rent-seeking) and special protection when it comes to
computer databases.41
Patents provide a particularly interesting area of study in the
intellectual property public choice landscape. Scholars who conducted
empirical research on patent lobbying expenditures and congressional
behavior concluded, for example, that:
Congress does not have a point of view independent from the
stakeholders in the patent system. Rather, their votes on the Patent
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, reflect the participation and preferences
of major stakeholders, such as the information technology industry, the
pharmaceutical industry, the law associations, and the manufacturing
42

sector.

35.
Lionel Bently & Brad Sherman, Great Britain and the Signing of the Berne Convention in
1886, 48 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 311, 311 (2001) (citations omitted).
36. Id. at312.
37.
Id. at 339-40.
38.
See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years a/Solicitude: Intellectual Propertv Law, 1900
2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2189 (2000).
39.
Id. at 2235.
40. Id. at 2236.
See id.
41.
42.
Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy ofthe Patent System, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1341, 1413 (2009).
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This reflects a larger trend on the part of the pharmaceutical and
biotechnological industries to advocate for stronger property rights, while
large corporations specializing in software and information technology
tend to prefer reduced protection.43 The large software and IT companies
fear "becoming hostage to small companies' patents" and thus favor less
stringent enforcement.4 4 Given the flexibility of congressmen when it
comes to their patent policy votes, any relative increases in power on the
part of pro-patent entities can lead to legislative proposals to increase
45
patent infringement sanctions and/or enforcement.
One of the mechanisms enabling proponents of stronger intellectual
property protection is also that, generally speaking, once laws with
relatively low penalties are passed, it can become comparatively easier to
raise said sanctions over time.4 6 This has had dramatic effects especially
in the copyright arena, where the law covered an increasing number of
behaviors and toughened its sanctions, which included the use of statutory
sanctions against large-scale file-sharers in ways that the drafters could
have never predicted.4 7 This ratcheting effect did not encounter significant
pushback from individual citizens and large media companies until the
negative responses to the introduction of the Stop Online Piracy Act
(SOPA) and Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and
Theft of Intellectual Property Act (PIPA or PROTECT IP Act), which
both sought to address to a greater degree online IP offenses. 48 Around the
same time, there was also public upheaval about the prosecution and
suicide of internet activist and IP infringer Aaron Swartz.49
The last decade has thus brought with it a level of popular attention
to and intervention into copyright policy that was essentially
unprecedented. Patent policy, on the other hand, is still largely driven by
the views of the big players. Most individuals generally do not become
embroiled in patent infringement, but-as is the case for trademark

43.
Id. at 1401.
44. Id. at 1370.
45.
See Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions /br Intellectual Property
Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 512 (2011) [hereinafter Manta, Puzzle of' Criminal
Sanctions].
46. See Irina D. Manta, The High Cost af/Low Sanctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 157, 178 (2014).
47. Seeid. at 179 184.
48. Id at 189 93.
49. See, e.g., Steven Musil, Researchers Honor Swartz's Memor' with PDF Protest, CNET
(Jan. 13, 2013), https://www.cnet.com/news/researchers-honor-swartzs-menory-with-pdf-protest/
[https://perma.cc/98E7-43 WY].
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infringement-this could change if technologies like 3D printing become
5
more widely used and present new risks to intellectual property owners. "
The political landscape of American intellectual property law has
generally been dominated by growth in value leading to a greater interest
in protection. This expansion has not been entirely unbridled, as
exemplified by safety valves such as the fair use doctrines in copyright
and trademark law, or ultimately the broad pushback in the years leading
up to and during the SOPA/PIPA Era. The large intellectual property
owners have also had public relations limitations placed on them. For
example, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) mostly
ceased pursuing individual users after popular backlash and the RIAA's
expenditure of significant amounts of legal fees in exchange for little
recovery.5 1
In the international context, after it reached developmental parity
with other nations and with few exceptions like its initial reluctance to
join the Berne Convention, the United States has been one of the major
advocates of stronger sanctions and greater enforcement because that is
what it sees as promoting the interest of its intellectual property producers.
Like international intellectual property scholar Graeme Dinwoodie has
stated, "as the leading exporter of intellectual property in the world, the
United States is a strong advocate for treaty membership and
implementation. '52 Indeed, "[b]y the twentieth century, the United States
was a leader in technological development and one of the world's military
and economic leadership superpowers," which led in 1994 to its advocacy
for the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS).5 3 One of the goals was to provide "a global disincentive
to infringe patented products that were placed into the global stream of
54
commerce."
The trajectory of the United States' role in treaty negotiation and
adoption is not particularly subtle: At the beginning of the nation's
50. See IrinaD. Manta, Intellectual Property and the Presumption of Innocence, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1745, 1780 (2015) (discussing this issue in the context of trademarks).
51. See Manta, supranote 45, at 514 (citing Ray Beckerman, Ha Ha Ia Ha Ha. RIAA PaidIts
Lawyers More Than $16,000,000 in 2008 to Recover Onlv $391,000!!!, RECORDING INDUSTRY VS
THE PEOPILE (July 13, 2010), http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2010/07/ha-ha-ha-haha-riaa-paid-its- lawyers.html [https://perma.cc/GL5Q-TGWP]).
52.

GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW 233

(2002).
53. Simone A. Rose, The Supreme Court and Patents: Moving Toward a Posimodern Vision
of "Progress"?,23 FORDHAM INTELE. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1197, 1220 (2013).
54. Id. at 1221 (citing Todd Rowe, Global Technology Protection.-Moving Past the Treaty, 4
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 107, 138 (2000) (identifying this task as the key reason for American
negotiators to work with foreign ones to reach international intellectual property agreements)).
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history, the United States' role as an intellectual property consumer led to
an appetite for free use of other countries' works. As the United States
developed economically and moved from being a later-mover to an
earlier-mover, it began demanding that other countries respect the
boundaries of its patented inventions, copyrighted works, and
trademarked goods. It will likely continue to do so unless it experiences a
tipping point in maintaining its pole position in the hierarchy of
intellectual property producers.
B.

Intellectual Propertyand Development in Japan

While the United States was arguably a later-mover in
industrialization vis-Ai-vis Great Britain, Japan was an across-the-board
later-mover when American gunboats under Matthew Perry forcibly
opened its markets to the world in 1853 by pressuring Japan into a trade
treaty with the United States. That treaty was quickly followed by a series
of similar trade treaties with other Western powers. Already beset by
numerous domestic challenges and general dynastic decline, the
Tokugawa Shogunate did not survive the humiliation of the unequal
treaties imposed upon it, and in 1868 the Shogunate was ended by the
Meiji Restoration.55 Coming during a period of Tokugawa dynastic
decline, the treaties galvanized young, reform-minded samurai to organize
around the emperor to overthrow the Shogunate and to enact reforms that
would safeguard Japan from the Western encroachment that Japan and
other East Asian countries increasingly suffered. As one of its first acts,
in 1871, the new Meiji government sent the Iwakura Mission to all
Western countries with whom it had been compelled to sign treaties. Led
by Tonomi Iwakura, the mission had three goals: to make goodwill visits
with the fifteen heads of state with whom Japan had been forced into
diplomatic relations; to sound out these foreign governments on the
possibility of renegotiating the unequal treaties Japan had been compelled

55.

The Tokugawa Shogunate was the de jure feudal military government that ruled Japan

between 1603 and 1868. John Whitney Hall, Introduction, in 4 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN:
EARLY MODERN JAPAN 4 (John Whitney Hall ed., 1991). See generally Joseph R. Strayer, The
Tokugawa Period and Japanese Feudalism, in STUDIES IN THE INSTITUTIONAl. HISTORY OF EARLY

MODERN JAPAN (John Whitney Hall & Marius B. Jansen eds., 1968). The Meiji Restoration, enacted
by the Meiji government that succeeded the Tokugawa Shogunate, was the series of political, social,
and economic reforms that created modern Japan, turning it from a feudal country to an industrialized,
developed country. Marius B. Jansen, Introduction, in 5 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN: THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 5 (Marius B. Jansen ed., 1989). See generally WILLIAM G. BEASLEY, THE
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(1972):

JOHN H. SAGERS,

RECONCILING CONFUCIANISM AN)

ORIGINS OF JAPANESE WEALTH

CAPITALISM, 1830

1885 (2006).

AND POWER:

IP AND KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER

2018]

to sign in the aftermath of the Perry Expedition; and finally,56 "to learn
firsthand about the West and ferret out its secrets for success.
While it might seem a long time ago today, the Meiji era continues
to be important for modem Japan, especially when considering postwar
industrial policy and intellectual property laws. Industrial policy goes
back to the Meiji era, as do the roots of the fabled Ministry of Commerce
and Industry and its successor, the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI). 57 The Meiji Restoration also illustrates the level of
institutional transformation required to successfully industrialize, and the
comprehensive knowledge transfer that informed that institutional
transformation.
The Iwakura Mission represents one of the most important and most
organized campaigns of knowledge transfer in modem history. The
Mission was assisted in its many ports of call by Japanese nationals who
were sent out by the Meiji government to study in the West.f1 After
quickly concluding meetings with the officials of host governments, the
Mission spread out to study the political, economic, and social systems of
the countries it visited. Its members were animated by two questions:
First ....How did the West come to arrive at its contemporary
condition? To what, that is, could one attribute the wealth, power, and
cultural achievements that seemed so evident everywhere in the United
States and Europe. Second, how might the island nation of Japan...
so that it too might enter the ranks of
shape its own quest for modernity
59
the world's advanced nations.
Over the course of two years of close study of the West, the Japanese
missioners found that the wealth and power they observed was the product
of a specific historical process which had given the West a significant lead
over Japan. However, that lead appeared to be only of some 40 years, and
it could be closed and overcome with the right policies. 60 One critical way
in which that gap could be closed would be through education:

56.

JAMES L. MCCLAIN, JAPAN: A MODERN HISTORY 202 (2002) [hereinafter MCCLAIN,

MODERN HISTORY].
57.

CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL

PouicY, 1925 1975 31, 81-111 (1984).
58.

Ian Nish, Introduction, in THE IWAKURA MISSION IN AMERICA & EUROPE: A NEW

ASSESSMENT 6 8 (Ian Nish ed., 1998).
59.

MCCLAIN, MODERN HISTORY, supra note 56, at 173.

Marlene J. Mayo, Rationality in the Meiji Restoration: The Iwakura Embassy, in MODERN
60.
JAPANESE LEADERSHIP: TRANSITION AND CHANGE 357 58 (Bernard S. Silberman & H.D.
Harootunian eds., 1966).
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We clearly must have schools if we are to encourage our country's
development as a civilized country, improve ordinary people's
knowledge, establish the power of the state, and maintain our
independence and sovereignty.... Our people are no different from the
Americans or6 Europeans
of today: it is all a matter of education or lack
1
of education.
The conclusion was that of the many reforms the Meiji government had
to make, education was among the most important. Already in 1872,
before the end of the Iwakura Mission, the Meiji government created a
modern school system with four-year compulsory education for boys and
girls, likely based on the observation that in the advanced West both boys
and girls were educated. As in the West at the time, education was seen
as a way to impart useful skills, inculcate loyalty to the national state, and
promote nationalism.62 As such, education was intimately linked with the
overall Meiji project of attaining the "wealth and power" needed to
survive in a hostile international system where the strong ate the weak.
The focus on education by the Meiji government is important for two
reasons. On the one hand, human capital formation plays an important and
in fact critical role in long-term economic growth.63 On the other hand,
the importance of education illustrates the transformative change that the
Meiji leadership undertook. Japanese development strategy was not
limited to importing any specific technique, technology, or body of
science, as it was in nineteenth-century Khedivate Egypt.64 The Meiji
initiative to transform Japan was rooted in the lwakura Mission's
perception that the West's "wealth and technological advances were the
products of customs and institutions that were fundamentally different
from those in China and Japan.- 65 Beyond working on education, Meiji
reformers also sought to transform the legal system.
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That law was fundamental to the functioning of a modem country
its
economy was not a hard argument to make in nineteenth-century67
and
66 (before which everyone
was equal)
Japan. Impersonal law
administrated by a meritocratic bureaucracy in a highly centralized state
has deep roots in Chinese and Japanese political theory, thought, and
practice. 68 However, law was primarily administrative and used "to
maintain power and policy. '69 It was seen as an "instrument for the
complete control of all citizens by the government; punishments were
made severe enough to have exemplary effect upon the whole people;
stem surveillance over the feudal barons and people insured peace and
order; and government control was applied to economic activities. 70 In
other words, the legal system filled a practical function by furthering the
interests of a state. However, Japan's legal system seemed arbitrary to
Western observers, and Meiji reformers realized that Japan could not hope
to revise the unequal treaties imposed upon it until the country, in the eyes
of the West, "became a nation governed in accordance with rational
laws."' 7' A constitution and legal system more recognizable by the West
were needed, and both were cobbled together largely using foreign
models. 72 Japan has a civil law system because this framework is easier to
implement from scratch. The civil code was modeled on both German and
French law, 73 while its commercial code was largely inspired by German
example.74
The first patent law was created in 1871, several years before the
civil and commercial codes were finalized, but it was considered a failure
and quickly abolished.75 The promulgation of the law became a priority
because a patent system in general-and definitely one like the United
States'-was seen as critical not necessarily to reward inventors, but to
66.

VICTORIA TIN-BOR HUI, WAR AND STATE-FORMATION IN ANCIENT CHINA AND EARLY

MODERN EUROPE 103 (2005).
67. Id. at 172.
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69.
HISTORY OF EARLY MODERN JAPAN 214 (John W. Hall & Marius B. Jansen eds., 1968).
70.
Chang, supra note 68, at 10.
MCCLAIN, MODERN HISTORY, supra note 56, at 185.
71.
72.
JOSEPH PITTAU, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN EARLY MEIJI JAPAN, 1868-1889 131 157 (1967);
Daikichi Irokawa. The Impact of Western Culture. in CULTURE OF THE MEIJI PERIOD 56 58 (1985).
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encourage innovation.7 6 In 1885, a new patent law was promulgated, and
the ministry that would one day become MITI (rather than the Ministry of
Justice) was given responsibility for patents. While Japan had bilateral
treaties with a limited number of countries, it waited until 1899 to join the
Paris Convention, which allowed foreigners to patent in Japan. 7 In 1899
Japan also joined the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works. This is, of course, similar to the United States' pattern of
not extending intellectual property protection to foreigners until quite late.
To no small degree, joining these conventions was part of the larger Meiji
project of having the country be released from "semicolonial status" and
reaching "acceptance into the comity of great powers. 7 8
Already by the early twentieth century, there was a well-functioning
domestic market for patents, suggesting a well-ordered system.79
Furthermore, not only did American companies such as General Electric
register thousands of patents in Japan, Japanese innovations were
frequently patented in the United States. By the middle of the 1880s,
patents per capita in Japan were rising rapidly, and over the course of forty
years, Japan went from 0.6 percent of the United States' figure to 15
percent. 81 Meiji-era investments in education and innovation paid quick
dividends, with increasing licensing of patents by Japanese to foreign
companies and significant independent technical advances.1 2 In a
qualitative and quantitative study examining "the role of domestic
inventive activity versus international transfers of knowledge," Tom
Nicholas finds extensive support for "the idea of a dynamic Japanese
innovation sector," and for the idea that "Japanese inventors drove the
level and structure of inventive activity towards that observed in
technologically advanced nations., 83 In other words, in the pre-war
period, the Japanese patent system was considered reliable by foreign
companies. Far from simply reimplementing Western technology,
Japanese companies were able to innovate independently.
In Japan, given the apparently good evidence for support for
intellectual property protection and more significantly production, the

76. Id. at 135 36.
77. ld. at 137.
78.
MCCLAIN, MODERN HISTORY, supra note 56, at 283.
79.
Nicholas & Shimizu, supra note 75.
80.
Shigehiro Nishimura, International Patent Control and Transfr of Knowledge: The
United States andJapan Be/bre World War 11, 9 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 1,9 (2011).
81.
Nicholas & Shimizu, supra note 75, at 130.
82. Id. at 132.
83.
Tom Nicholas, The Origins of the Japanese Technological Modernization, 48
EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 272,288 (2011).
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overall picture of protection and infringement is muddled by the post-war
' 84
complaints of widespread patent infringement and "unfair competition. "
John Lindgren and Craig Yudell stated in 1994:
According to recent Tokyo press reports, the United States and Japan
are once again at war-this time, though, it is a "Patent War." Over the
last decade, American companies have become extremely aggressive in
seeking worldwide protection from infringement of their intellectual
property. American corporations have recently focused their efforts on
the high-tech companies of Japan. These American companies have
gone beyond asserting U.S. patents against imports of Japanese
companies in the United States and are now actively pursuing patent
protection against Japanese companies in Japan itself. Those Japanese
companies, of course, are responding in kind, spending large amounts
and labor on patent acquisition, both in Japan and in the United
of money
85
States.
The authors present clear examples of what can perhaps charitably be
called questionable behavior by Japanese companies and by the Japanese
patent office, chief among which is the thirty-year processing time for
Texas Instruments' Kilby patent of the integrated circuit. 6 This respite
allowed Japan to develop its own semiconductor industry. That is not to
say that the delay was a complete loss for Texas Instruments. Being
awarded a patent in 1989, as opposed to 1959, proved lucrative to the
company because Japan's semiconductor industry was by the late 1980s
several orders of magnitudes larger than it had been in87the late 1950s, and
the company's royalties were correspondingly larger.
Given the technical proficiency and innovativeness of Japanese
industry before the war, it seems unlikely that Japanese infringement was
as widespread as claimed in the American press. More likely is perhaps
that while Japan had massive production capacity (a high capacity for
innovation especially in the reductions of cost and complexity) but
comparatively little intellectual property, the United States at the time had
less production capacity (was less able or willing to produce at low cost)
but had comparatively more intellectual property. 8 In retrospect, it would
seem that patents were wielded by American companies, and by extension

84. See Robert B. Reich, Is Japan Out to Get Us?, N.Y. TIMES para. 5 (Feb. 9, 1992),
[https://perma.cc/G4PShttps://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/09/books/is-japan-out-to-get-us.html
Y7RT].
Lindgren & Yudell, supranote 15, at 2.
85.
86.
Id. at 7.
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Id. at 8.
88.
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the American government, to negate the Japanese later-mover advantage
in high technology.
Over the course of the 1990s, headlines about Japanese-American
patent wars disappeared when Japan entered its Lost Decade (a decadelong period of economic stagnation following the collapse of an asset
bubble). Increasing competition from other East Asian economies
coincided with the ability of the United States to take a commanding lead
in the computer revolution, which included companies like IBM, Intel,
Microsoft, Hewlett Packard, Dell, and Apple leveraging the unique
innovation pipeline of Silicon Valley.8 9 With the acquisition and
production of vast amounts of intellectual property (not least the
copyrighted material owned and produced by the film and music studios
that were bought by Japanese companies), Japan in the 1990s found itself
like the United States before it with less and less production capacity
relative to the rapidly expanding value of its intellectual property. 90 After
a decade of antagonism, the Japanese and United States governments
began cooperating on strengthening intellectual property protection
domestically as well as internationally. Later-mover Japan had by the
1990s become an earlier-mover relative to the rest of East Asia in general,
and to China in particular.
C.

Intellectual Propertyand Development in China

While 2018 saw the fortieth anniversary of the beginning of the
Opening Up and Reform Era in China, it also witnessed the anniversary
of another series of policies that were in some ways more consequential,
the 1898 Hundred Days of Reform. Thirty years after Japan's Meiji
Restoration, China's Qing Dynasty began its own (eventually aborted)
attempts to self-strengthen. 9' Those ultimately failed to have an effect,
with the emperor who initiated them de .facto deposed, and with key
would-be reformers punished. The continued dynastic decline and popular
hardship set off an increasingly frantic search for a solution to China's
travails. As miseries multiplied, intellectuals became ready to jettison any
knowledge or traditional practice that did not promote the national
imperative of restoring China's wealth and power. As had been the case
in Japan, regardless of provenance, any knowledge or practice that had

89.
See generally Samuelson, supra note 16.
90. Sadao Nagaoka, Determinants of High-Royalty Contracts and the Impact of Stronger
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Japan, 19 J. JAPANESE & INT'L FCONS. 233, 235 (2005).
91.
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practical value would be adopted. 92 While Japan had seemed a promising
model to many, in the end the Soviet Union's anti-imperialism and
success in "turning a poor agrarian economy into an industrial
powerhouse" made communism the more attractive model to China.9 3
In the early twentieth century, for many poor countries the model of
the Soviet Union seemed to offer the fastest method for achieving wealth
and power. The acceptance of Marxist-Leninism was in the case of China
never slavish, and Chinese leadership has been willing to learn from
foreign and domestic 94 examples and experiments. Like Japan, China
made full use of the later-mover advantage as it used, experimented with,
and implemented social, economic, and political reforms.
The first thirty years of the new republic saw massive basic
infrastructure investments, human capital formation, and the creation of a
manufacturing base. While these investments all became important for the
explosive economic growth in the last decades of the twentieth century,95
the human capital investments of earlier decades played a particularly
large role.96 China had begun the twentieth century with one of the lowest
literacy rates among twenty to twenty-four year olds, and by the time of
the Opening Up and Reform Era, it had (among the young) literacy rates
similar to those of the West. 97 By the time of the Reform Era, Chinese
labor was cheap (as in low-cost, but highly qualified) compared to other
developing countries outside of East Asia.

92.

ORVI LLE SCHELL & JOHN DELURY, WEALTH AND POWER: CHINA'S LONG MARCH TO THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY loc. 80 108 (2013) (ebook).
93.

NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE: MODERNIZATION THEORY IN COLD WAR

AMERICA 42 (2003).
Cf Sebastian Heilmann, Policv Experimentation in China's Economic Rise, 43 STUD.
94.
COMP. INT'L DEV. 1 (2008).

95.
Y. Y. Kueh, The Maoist Legacy and China's New IndustrializationStrategy, 119 CHINA
Q. 420, 422 (1989).
96.

JEAN

DREZE

&

AMARTYA

SEN,

INDIA:

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT

AND

SOCIAL

OPPORTUNITY 73 75 (1995). See also Amartya Sen, Passage to China, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 2,
[https://perma.cc/4ZJFhttps://www.nybooks.com/articles/2004/12/02/passage-to-china/
2004),
K7DZ]; Amartya Sen, What China Could Teach India, Then and Now, ASIA SOC'Y (Feb. 17, 2005),
https://asiasociety.org/amartya-sen-what-china-could-teach-india-then-and-now
[https://perma.cc/VT58-55TQ].
97.
Ottervik, supra note 3.

[52:877

AKRON [AW Ri-VmEW

Regional Economic Growth in China 1954-2014

10
SGCoastal

Region

Central Region
ru

, WesternRegion
*

National Average

CL
a

.. .;+4
....

. . .

. . .

S.

Regional Economic Growth in China 1954-1980

a

W+

Central Region
S'Western

Region
Natonal Average

01

Figure 4. Regional Economic Growth in China 1954-2014

In tenns of economic growth, the significant difference between the
pre- and post-Reform Era was stability of growth, and not the absence or
presence of growth itself. The average yearly economic growth rate
between 1953 and 1978 was 6.5i); between 1978 and 2008 this number
was 9.9%. Either number puts China in line with the economic growth of
the rest of East Asia in the same time period. The significant difference
between the two time periods was that before 1978, economic growth
rates were subject to wild swings, with a 50% difference between peaks
and troughs, while later economic growth was more stable and
predictable." These swings were the most violent in the first twenty years,
and from the end of the 1960s, GDP per capita grew consistently. As
shown in Figure 4, the apparent lack of economic growth before the
Reform and Opening Up Era is largely a product of the scale of the
cumulative post-Reform economic growth. While GDP per capita for
any year might be arguable, the trend is congruent with improvements in
98.
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education, health, and agricultural productivity. 00 Furthermore, as argued
by Amartya Sen and others, the economic growth of China is the product,
not the driver, of human capital investments made over long periods of
time. China chose a development strategy that, in broad strokes, was not
too dissimilar from that of the rest of East Asia, which is to say significant
upfront investments in education, agricultural productivity, and economic
equality, with largely similar long-term results-high economic growth.

Unlike China's economic development, China's modem legal
system is a more recent phenomenon. At the foundation of the People's
Republic, large parts of the country had been outside the control of the
central government for decades. State-building-along with the
construction of a legal system-was a critical task for the new
government. The first decade of the new republic was largely one of
institutionalization and legalization, with the promulgation of the first
constitution in 1954, and with the building of ajudicial system. The 1960s
and early 1970s, by contrast, saw extensive deinstitutionalization and
deprofessionalization. 0 1 By the 1980s, two-thirds of all judges lacked law
degrees, and before the 1995 Judges' Law, "judges in China were not

treated as legal professionals." ' 112 The reason why such a small percentage

of judges had a formal judicial education was that the newly reopened
"Ministry of Justice announced in 1982 that no less than 57,000
'outstanding army officers' [were] given [abbreviated] legal training,

prior to being assigned to the court system. " 103 These judges were
who were to serve as
complemented by about 200,000 "judicial0 workers"
4

what might be called "barefoot" lawyers.1
In China, as in Japan, rule by law is a tradition with long roots, and
the judicial system filled primarily an administrative as opposed to a

judicial function. 05 After 1995, the judicial system was quickly
professionalized, and "[t]he proportion of judges holding [legal] degrees
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& POL. WKLY.51 (2012).
101.
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increased from 7 percent in 1995 to 56 percent in 2006."' 106 For the first
decades after the Opening Up and Reform Era, China was, for most intents
and purposes, without a recognizable judicial system. In the years leading
up to and following China's accession to the WTO, the government made
strenuous efforts to provide broader legal training, but the relationship
between judicial and administrative power in China will be complex for
07
the foreseeable future.1
As was the case in Japan some 110 years previously, a discussion of
the role of patents in economic development had taken place before the
creation of a modern legal system in China.""8 A law protecting the
proprietary rights of an inventor had been promulgated in the early 1950s,
but it was superseded in 1963 by new regulations which emphasized the
importance of freely sharing information.10 9 In 1978, the rights of an
individual inventor were once again recognized, but the tension between
individual reward and social benefit created extensive debate. 10
Just like in Japan a century earlier, the patent system was seen as a
means to promote invention, rather than reward individual inventors;
inventors received a limited monopoly as remuneration for their work or
"distribution according to labor."' ' A patent was seen as a relative right,
not an absolute one, and the 1984 Patent Law suggested that "not only is
the patentee obligated to work the patent, but the government may grant
a compulsory license to a party who exhibits a need to make use of the
patented technology."' 12 Similar to patents, trademarks were first legally
regulated in China in the early 1950s. Exclusive use was abolished in 1963
to make trademarks into signifiers of quality rather than source
indicators. 1 3 A 1981 analysis found that the 1963 regulations had largely
not succeeded in safe-guarding quality, and by 1982 a new Trademark
Law was promulgated, encouraging manufacturers to grow sales and
14
profits by developing consumer demand for their products.'
The purpose of the 1984 Patent Law was manifold: in the (then-) near
term, to encourage knowledge transfer by foreign companies by offering

106.
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them intellectual property protection; in the medium term, to encourage
domestic invention and innovation; and in the very long term, to ensure
reciprocal protection and guard Chinese intellectual property from
expropriation by foreigners." 5 Intellectual property protection in China
was then, as had been the case in Japan, not something imposed from the
outside, but rather chosen for its instrumental value. Foreign pressure to
strengthen intellectual property protection played a role for its
development, but the domestic factors behind the strengthening of
intellectual property protection were numerous. 116
Hand-in-hand with China's economic development, strengthening of
domestic (and increasingly exported) brands, and investments in (plus
returns to) domestic research and development, China has joined
international intellectual property treaties.' 17 Initially a quiescent
observer, China has become increasingly active in international
organizations, and has established bilateral relations in the same way the
United States and the European Union have. '
The Trump Administration's complaints of rampant intellectual
property infringement by China 1 9 are largely the same as U.S. complaints
during the 1980s: "During the 1980s and 1990s, the United States
repeatedly threatened China with economic sanctions, trade wars,
nonrenewal of most-favored-nation status, and opposition to China's
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO)." 2 ° As discussed above,
for most of this period China was without a judicial system comparable to
that found in the West. U.S. and Western complaints of intellectual
property infringement were not hard sells in China because strong
intellectual property protection was seen as fundamental for long-term
economic growth throughout the Reform Era. In 2006 President Hu Jintao
remarked that "the building of China's system of intellectual property
right [sic] and vigorously upgrading the capacity of creation,
management, protection and application regarding intellectual property
are our urgent need [sic] for the purpose of enhancing independent and
self-driven innovation capabilities and building an innovation-oriented
country.' 21 In other words, intellectual property production and
protection were seen by the top leadership as critical to China's future
Id at91 92.
115.
116. See generally Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 17.
117. Peter K. Yu, The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR. REV. INT'L
L. 209, 222 (2011).
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economic development. Ten years later, strengthening intellectual
property rights was a key part of Made in China 2025,122 China's now123
downplayed industrial policy.
As shown above in Figure 2, China's policy to increase intellectual
property production has borne fruit as trademark and patent applications
by Chinese entities have surpassed those of American or Japanese entities.
While the quality of some (or even many) of the patents might be
debatable, what is important is that in high tech (as shown by strategic
patenting1 24), a large quantity of patents has a quality all of its own. A
large patent portfolio protects against legal aggression by competitors, and
Chinese companies are building large patent portfolios for their
protection. 25 Just like Japanese companies, in response to U.S.
intellectual property suits, began to acquire and develop their own
considerable arsenal of intellectual property-if for no other reason than
as a defense-Chinese companies now seem to be doing the same. Given
the accelerating rate at which Chinese companies are accumulating
patents, this will likely have significant consequences over time in that
China could become as enthusiastic an enforcer of its intellectual property
rights overseas as the United States and Japan have been in the recent past.

IV. ANALYSIS
In the decades immediately after the Second World War, "Made in
Japan" was considered a bit of a joke and a signifier of poor or inferior
quality. However, that changed in the 1980s when highly competitive
Japanese car and consumer electronics manufacturers made headway in
the global and American market. A veritable cottage industry of books
12 6
critical of Japan and unfair Japanese competition sprung up overnight,
122.
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and U.S. presidential candidates openly mused about whether Americans
would be reduced to sweeping the dust from around Japanese
computers. 127

By the 1990s, some of the fear of a Japanese takeover had subsided
as investments made decades earlier paid dividends in the United States
in the form of the (American) personal computer revolution, and Japan
entered its Lost Decade in the aftermath of the collapse of an asset-price
bubble.'12 By the late 1980s, Japan found itself with an earlier-mover
advantage in many industries and was facing increasing competition from
later-movers, especially perhaps from South Korean companies.
Furthermore, Japanese companies had acquired significant stakes in film
and music studios with global sales, and therefore had an incentive to
safeguard intellectual property rights globally. With more intellectual
property to protect, Japan became, like the United States before it, an
enthusiastic supporter of an international intellectual property regime.
China (whose pillorying by American policymakers and media
arguably resembles that meted out to Japan some decades earlier) now
seems to be in a similar transition as precipitous rises in the production of
intellectual property have been accompanied by increasingly robust
intellectual property protection, and enforcement of that protection. China
appears to be following the path trod by the United States and Japan to
become a serious defender of intellectual property rights. From the
examples of the United States, Japan, and China, it seems that whether a
country chooses to infringe on versus protect intellectual property
depends on the relative value they perceive in the two. This has
implications for earlier-movers, like the United States, which perceive
themselves to have an edge over apparent competitors in the area of
intellectual property. Specifically, the creation of an intellectual property
regime that protects earlier-movers from later-movers could be
problematic for countries like the United States if the roles are ever
reversed. If the hierarchy of movers shifts, the relative interest in
intellectual property enforcement will as well, and China could seek to
protect its goods against infringement by a future later-mover such as the
United States and/or Japan someday.
The change that has already occurred in China's stance is not
surprising considering that the widespread international outsourcing of
manufacturing has made intellectual property a key asset for its private
James Reston, Mondale's Tough Line, N.Y. TIMES. para. 4 (Oct.
127.
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companies, strengthening the general tendencies of earlier-movers to
formulate and demand enforcement of strict intellectual property laws.
Because Chinese companies like Huawei, Lenovo, and Xiaomi (along
with many others) now have valuable brands and intellectual property of
their own, it was only to be expected that China's intellectual property
regime would be toughened. This is not to say that China's leadership was
previously insensitive to the importance of intellectual property for the
functioning of a modem economy. As discussed above, a patent law was
implemented in the early days of reform, before there was a modem or
even recognizably functioning judicial system. The law had been debated
for years and was implemented to promote China's technological and
economic development.1 29 This would suggest that countries like China
respond not only to exogenous pressure from earlier-movers like the
United States and Japan to increase intellectual property protection, but
also to internal motivations.
While the focus of this analysis is on intellectual property, it should
be noted that the most critical knowledge transfer to Japan and China
involved not proprietary knowledge, but rather institutions. When the
United States pilfered the intellectual property and proprietary knowledge
of European entities (whether it was private companies wantonly
reprinting the works of British authors or the government encouraging
illicit transfer of knowledge through migration of engineers), 1 ° the U.S.
3
had a largely similar institutional framework as its European victims. 1
Western countries shared some form of rule of law, near-universal
132
education, high levels of gender equality implicated in development,
and an Enlightenment heritage. The differences that existed between
Western countries paled in comparison to the difference between any
given Western country and nineteenth-century later-movers like Japan,
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China, or Turkey. Once committed to development, Japan 33and China
transformed their social, political, and economic institutions.
Both Japan and China show how later-movers have an advantage visA-vis earlier-movers; can learn from the successes and failures of earliermovers; and-through selection and adaptation of development policy,
institutions, and technology-can catch up to earlier-movers. For
policymakers who are interested in long-term economic competitiveness,
it would therefore be worthwhile to look beyond the immediate problems
of intellectual property infringement to better understand the policies that
support the political, economic, and scientific development of an
"unfairly" competing country. As Japan and China found early on,
copying current technology has little long-term value by itself. What they
needed and what they implemented for their development were the
institutions that would allow them to innovate and produce their own
intellectual property.
The patterns that apply to successful developers such as the United
States, Japan, and China might not hold universally. What is suggested by
the experience of these countries, however, is that there is a relationship
between earlier-/later-mover status and intellectual property protection. A
larger sample of countries is needed to determine whether or not this
relationship is universal. Even without a larger sample, it can probably
safely be said that intellectual property infringement per se is not a
shortcut to long-term economic development. All three countries
discussed here first had or built the institutions and human capital needed
for innovation, and this allowed them to absorb and build off of transferred
knowledge.
V.

CONCLUSION

The examples of the United States, Japan, and China suggest that
countries' views about and willingness to enact as well as vigorously
enforce intellectual property laws may track their level of not just absolute
but also relative economic development. These countries saw rapid
economic growth by first identifying and then building the human and
physical infrastructure needed to sustain growth, and then selectively (by
means fair and foul) learning from other countries. When the edge
regarding useful intellectual property lay with others, these countries
tended to (or at least were perceived to) inadequately protect the
intellectual property of more developed countries. As later-mover
133. See generally MARIUS B. JANSEN, THlE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN (2000); SPENCE, supra
note 103.
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countries developed, their intellectual property laws also became
increasingly comprehensive. These countries additionally became more
likely to enforce their intellectual property internationally. With economic
growth, countries that previously acted as industrial spies and infringers
of others' intellectual property seem to become stalwart defenders and
maintainers of (their own) intellectual property rights.
The implication of the above is likely that in the long run, while
intellectual property protection is important, production is equally if not
more important. It is not protection of intellectual property alone that will
allow any country to maintain an edge vis-A-vis other countries. Nor is
past innovation likely to be of much use in the future unless it is
continually built upon. Long-term economic competitiveness appears to
be predicated on a capacity to develop new science and technologies. That
capacity is likely a product of institutional frameworks. To the extent that
a country overemphasizing protection of its old intellectual property
distracts it from an examination of the policy initiatives that catapult latermovers to be able to compete (unfairly or not) with earlier-movers, that
emphasis could prove to be highly disadvantageous to it in the long term.
Taking a longer perspective on the protection of intellectual property
rights and the role they play in the development of earlier-movers and
later-movers suggests that while these rights are important, they implicate
several policy areas and should not be considered in isolation. As
demonstrated by the cases of Japan and China, rapid development is a
multi-faceted process, requiring study and coordination of social and
economic policy. It would stand to reason that competing with, or keeping
pace with, a rapid developer would require the same effort. In 2012, Peter
Yu hinted at the possibility that "[t]he changing dynamics in the global
economy and the improved technological capabilities in China therefore
could result in a role reversal."' 34 The years since that statement, and the
developments in the U.S. and Chinese political landscapes, may engender
this result faster than might have been predicted.
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